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The Asymmetry of Ronald Dworkin's
Rights Thesis in Criminal Cases: A
Troublesome Exception

H. SCOTT FAIRLEY*

ProfessorDworkin has proposed that hard cases, those where no settled
rule dictates a clear decision, should be decided by an analysis of the
rights to be accorded to each of the parties. Judges, in these situations,are
not making new law or policy decisions but are determining the rights of
the parties according to existing principles of law. Dworkin's thesis asserts that one of the partieshas a right to win depending on the principles
involved. However, he qualifies this theory with regard to criminal cases.
"The accused.., has a right to a decision in hisfavor if he is innocent, but
the state has no parallelright to a conviction if he is guilty." Dworkin bases this exception to the rights thesis on his concept of individual versus
majority rights. To weigh individualrights against the rights of the majority will always result in the displacement of individual rights. Therefore,
majority rights cannot be used to justify overruling individual rights.
Only the competing individual rights are to be considered.
The author generally acknowledges the correctness of the rights thesis,
but disputes the criminal exception. He does this by analysis of the very
cases on which Dworkin relies and by raisingquestions as to the nature of
criminal prosecution. If the state represents the victim as an individual,
there are substantial individual rights to be considered on the prosecution's side, which if the accused is guilty, would give the victim a right to a
conviction.

Professor Dworkin has offered the view that judges should de* Candidate for the Ontario Bar; B.A., 1974, LL.B., 1977; Queen's University
of Kingston; LL.M. 1979, New York University, LL.M./Thesis Candidate, Harvard
Law School.

cide and do decide "hard cases" i.e., those where no settled rule
disposes the issue through a process of discovering what the
"rights" of the parties are. This is done primarily on the basis of
"existing principles" within the legal system which must be identified, evaluated and competitively weighed to determine who will
be the successful party.' Central to the position advanced by Professor Dworkin is a classically liberal preoccupation with "individuals" whose rights are to be protected by the application of
these legal principles. Accordingly, therefore, arguments of "policy" which characteristically "justify a political decision by showing that the decision advances or protects some collective goal of
the community as a whole" 2 do not and should not govern the ju3
dicial resolution of civil cases.
The application of principles descriptive of individual rights involves a rigorous process necessitating resort to a judicial "Hercules" 4 for the achievement of the "articulate consistency" required
by Professor Dworkin's theory.5 The rights thesis forms the
spearhead of a philosophical and jurisprudential attack, 6 directed
against Professor H. L. A. Hart's positivist concept 7 of the imputed role of judicial discretion when the rule for deciding a case
is unclear. This assault has already provoked an impressive array
of analysis and criticism by legal philosophers. 8 The purpose in
this analysis, however, is not to offer either an explanation or a
critique of the rights thesis as an overall concept. Rather, this
writer wishes to proceed on the unproved assumption that Dworkin's rights thesis is basically valid, and is partially invalid with
regard to the exception allowed in the application of his notion of
1. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1057 (1975) reprinted in R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHrs SERIOUSLY 81 (1977) [hereinaftercited as TRS].
2. TRS, supra note 1, at 82.
3. Id. at 84.
4. Id. at 105.
5. "Consistency here, of course, means consistency in the application of the
principle relied upon, not merely in the application of the particular rule announced in the name of that principle." Id. at 88.
6. That is, Professor Dworkin means to demonstrate not only the theoretical
superiority of the rights thesis at a normative level but to show that it also provides a better account of the reality of judicial decision-making. Id. at 84.
7. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
8. This criticism has been both gentle and probing: see Mackie, The Third
Theory of Law, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1977); Hart, American Jurisprudence
Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969
(1977). Other criticisms have been somewhat more vituperative. See also Greenawalt, Policy, Rights and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991 (1977); Richards,
Taking Rights Seriously.- Reflections on Dworkin and the American Revival of
Natural Law, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1265 (1977). Professor Dworkin has recently replied to prominent detractors in Dworkin, SEVEN CRITICS, 11 GA. L. REV. 1201
(1977), and in a new appendix to TRS, supra note 1, entitled R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Paper ed., 1978).
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entitlement (i.e., a right to a decision in one's favor) in criminal
cases.
THE DISPUTED EXCEPTION

Dworkin interjects a qualification to his theory at the conclusion of a discussion concerning explicit judicial references to economic policy underlying particular decisions. 9 He notes "a certain
limitation of the rights thesis":
It holds in standard civil cases, when the ruling assumption is that one of
the parties has a right to win; but it holds only asymmetrically when that
assumption cannot be made. The accused in a criminal case has a right to
a decision in his favor if he is10innocent, but the state has no parallel right
to a conviction if he is guilty.

This writer wishes to dispute the proposition that, as a general
rule "the State has no parallel right to a conviction." It is this
writer's view that such a conclusion involves an assumption concerning the nature of criminal prosecutions that ignores a fundamental aspect regarding who and what the State represents in a
criminal trial.
In support of the declared exception, Dworkin cites the United
States Supreme Court decision in Linkletter v. Walker." He also
makes reference to the earlier decision in Mapp v. Ohio.12 Dworkin views Mapp as an example of an instance where "[t]he court
may therefore find in favor of the accused, in some hard case testing rules of evidence, for example, on an argument of policy that
does not suppose that the accused has any right to be acquitted."13
It is possibly quite true that Mapp had no "right" to be acquitted on the basis of the evidence brought against her, since the
Supreme Court merely extended the operation of an exclusionary
rule already established for federal courts. 14 "All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Federal Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal trial in a state court."15 At
9. TRS, supra note 1, at 94-100. He attempts in particular to reconcile
Learned Hand's theory of liability for negligence as enunciated in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960).
10. TRS, supra note 1, at 100.
11. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
12. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
13. TRS, supra note 1, at 100.
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914).
15. 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), insofar

first glance it would appear that the decision in Mapp reinforces
the point Professor Dworkin wishes to make without otherwise
affecting his thesis. However, he chooses to rely on the decision
in Linkletter for support by explaining the earlier decision. This
is an analytical device which does not effectively convey that
which Dworkin wishes to assert.
In Linkletter the Supreme Court considered the sole question
of whether the newly created rule in Mapp should be applied retroactively to state court convictions which had become final
before its rendition. The court held16 that the Mapp rule did not
operate retroactively even though the unlawful seizure of evidence in the case antedated a similar violation in Mapp. Unfortunately for Linkletter, the Louisiana courts were more prompt in
rendering judgment than were the Ohio courts, and it was that
date which the court viewed as determinative of the issue.17
What is interesting and somewhat puzzling in view of Dworkin's reliance on Linkletter is that the Court appears to apply a
policy rationale having an effect opposite of that in Mapp; it upheld the conviction and denied the accused the right to an acquittal. The majority perceived the primary purpose of Mapp to be
the enforcement of the fourth amendment through the inclusion
of the exclusionary rule within its rights, and this purpose would
not be advanced by making the rule retroactive."' 8 Professor
Dworkin might reply that such an observation missed the point,19
that Miss Mapp had no right to an acquittal and that the same observation would apply to Mr. Linkletter under the circumstances
of his conviction. However, given that both cases involve the assertion of an existing right to protection under the Constitution,
such a view appears troublesome in the context of Dworkin's thesis as a whole.
One writer has taken Dworkin to task for his apparent tolerance
of prospective overruling in criminal cases in an attempt to demolish the rights thesis, at least insofar as it claims to "describe"
how judges decide cases. 20
If judges do in fact adhere to the rights thesis, their attitude towards retroactivity should be clear: all decisions should 'be given full retroactive effect because they reflect the rights that litigants have always had and
because there can be no reason for distinguishing between the litigant
presenting the case [Mapp v. Ohio] in which the decision is made and the
as that decision left the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment within the discretion of state courts.
16. Clark, J., Black, J.; Douglas, J., dissented.
17. 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
18. Id. at 618 (headnote); see also 381 U.S. at 636, 637.
19. TRS, supra note 1, at 100.
20. Brilmayer, The Institutionaland Empirical Basis of the Rights Thesis, 11
GA. L. REV. 1173, 1190-1196 (1977).
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person whose2 1conviction is final [Linkletter v. Walker] but is seeking collateral relief.

Professor Brilmayer appears to believe that Dworkin allows for
an exception to the rights thesis in an attempt to escape an inconsistency created by the retroactivity issue, 22 as exemplified by
23
Mapp, which was clearly premised on a policy of deterrence.

24
Moreover, Brilmayer asserts that this attempt fails.
Brilmayer makes a good argument as it demonstrates that Professor Dworkin's exception to the rights thesis "cannot explain

why prospective overruling should be used [by states] in civil

cases ... prior to Linkletter."25 In support of this proposition,
Brilmayer cites United States Supreme Court decision in Great
Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.26 That case
upheld a refusal by the Montana Supreme Court to apply its rul.
ing retroactively with regard to impugned freight tariffs that had
previously been valid under state law.
Delivering the opinion of the Court in Sunburst, Mr. Justice
Cardozo found as a preliminary matter that "[b]y implication of
law there had been written into the statute a notice to all concerned that payments exacted by a carrier in conformity with a
published tariff were subject to be refunded if found thereafter,
27
upon sufficient evidence, to be excessive and unreasonable."
Thus, in the view of the Court, "prospective overruling on these
facts involved no unfair surprise to either party in the dispute."28
21. Id. at 1190.
22. In support of a limited retroactive application of constitutional decisions
and of the legitimacy of prospective overruling, see Mishkin, The High Cour4 the
Great Writ and the Due Processof Time and Law, 79 HARv. L REV. 56 (1965); contra to the effect that all newly declared constitutional rights should be given retroactive effect, see Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability and Due Process: A Reply to
ProfessorMishkin, 33 U. Cm. L REV. 719 (1966).
23. Brilmayer, supra note 20, at 1193, citing Bender, The Retroactive Effect of
an Overruling ConstitutionalDecision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 650, 659
(1962). The "sole rational justification (of the exclusionary rule) is the experience
of its indispensability in'exertling] general legal pressures to secure obedience to
the Fourth Amendmenc on the part of federal law-enforcing officers.' As it serves
this function, the rule is a needed, but grudgingly taken, medicament; no more
should be swallowed ti.an is needed to combat the disease." Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 388-89 (1964).
24. See note 20 supra, at 1194-95.
25. Id. at 1194.
26. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
27. Id. at 362.
28. Id. at 364. "There, the techni;ue (of prospective overruling) is justified on
the ground that some judicial lawmaking is desirable but that it should be done in

Having identified the "tentative character" of the party's rights,
Mr. Justice Cardozo affirmed the decision of the Montana
Supreme Court denying retroactiity 29 stating as follows:
We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject. A state
in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later
overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions ....

On

the other hand, it may hold to the ancient dogma that the law declared by
its courts had a Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration, in
which event the discredited will be viewed as if it had never been, and the
reconsidered declaration as law from the beginning .

.

. The choice for

any state may be determined by the juristic philosophy of the judges of
her courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature. We30review not
the wisdom of their philosophies, but the legality of their acts.

The Court in Linkletter expressly adopted the foregoing analysis of the retroactivity issue, 31 but applied it only after taking care
to demonstrate that "no distinction was drawn between civil and
criminal litigation ."32 in taking this approach regarding the
problem at hand.
Mr. Justice Clark then elaborated on a matter that Professor
Dworkin would find difficult to characterize as other than a policy
rationale for electing between alternatives in deference to a "collective goal" of the community.
Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor
prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh
the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the
rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation. We believe that this approach is
Amendment's prohibiparticularly correct with reference to the Fourth
33
tions as to unreasonable searches and seizures.

Logic dictates that Dworkin should be disturbed by this judgment and the context in which it arose. However, in setting forth
the proposition that the rights thesis applies asymmetrically in
criminal cases, he ignores the context in which the Court saw no
a way which does not disappoint expectations." See also Brilmayer, supra note 20,
at 1195.
29. 91 Mont. 216, 7 P.2d 927 (1932).
30. 287 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1932).
31. 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
32. Id. at 627, citing James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Chicot County
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); United States v. Schooner
Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801); State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940).
33. 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)
[W] e must look to the purpose of the Mapp rule; the reliance placed upon
the Wolf doctrine; and the effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective application of Mapp ....

Mapp had as its prime purpose the

enforcement of the Fourth Amendment through the inclusion of the exclusionary rule within its rights. This, it was found, was the only effective deterrent to lawless police action ... We cannot say that this purpose would
be advanced by making the rule retrospective ....
Id. at 636-37.
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distinction for its reasoning between a criminal case and "stan3
dard civil cases" where the rights thesis allegedly holds. 4
It is noteworthy that Professor Dworkin qualifies his acceptance
of the authorities he cites, a policy that he doubtless would continue in reply to the present argument:
I do not mean that a constitutional decision on some grounds is proper, or
even that the Court's later description of its earlier decision is accurate. I
mean only to point out how the geometry of a criminal prosecution, which
does not set opposing rights in a case against one another, differs from
the
35
standard civil case in which the rights thesis holds symmetrically.

Even so, in offering proof of the "descriptive validity" of his assertions, Dworkin must take the cases as he finds them. Given this
reality, Dworkin nonetheless overlooks the implication of Linkletter to his theory-that the civil/criminal distinction collapses
upon the same reasoning Dworkin cites for its existence. Thus,
there must be a fallacy either in the rights thesis itself, as
Brilmayer suggests, or in the created exception, which Dworkin
does not adequately explain. The remainder of this paper discusses the view that the error lies in the "exception" and not the
rule.
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW TO QUESTIONED ASSUMPTIONS
OMISSIONS

AND

The basic character of the rights thesis perhaps suggests why
Professor Dworkin concedes the existence of, yet does not elaborate upon, that which he perceives to be an appropriately asymmetrical application of the theory to criminal prosecutions.
Indeed, he elaborates only to the extent necessary to reconcile
difficult case law with the descriptive aspects of his theory. In
Dworkin's view, "[a] political right is an individuated political
aim" whereas "[ a] goal is a nonindividuated political aim, that is,
a state of affairs whose specification does not in this way call for
any particular opportunity or resource or liberty for particular individuals."36 Thus, while he would "count legal persons as individuals" and allow for special "group rights,"3 7 the
34. TRS, supra note 1, at 100.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 91.
37. "I count legal persons as individuals, so that corporations may have rights;
a political theory that counts special groups, like racial groups, as having some
corporate standing within the community may therefore speak of group rights."
Id. at 91 n.1.

instrumentality of the state, which represents society as a whole,
cannot have rights under the concept Dworkin has framed.

Dworkin emphasizes the point by again displaying a classically
liberal sensitivity to the untrammeled power of the state. Hence,
he speaks of "rights against the Government," the existence of
which
would be jeopardized if the Government were able to defeat such a right
by appealing to the right of a democratic majority to work its will. A right
against the Government must be a right to do something even when the
majority thinks it would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority
would be worse off for having it done. If we now say that society has a
right to do whatever is in the general benefit.., and we mean that these
are the sort of rights that provide justification for overruling any rights
against the Government that may conflict, then we have annihilated the
latter rights.
In order to save them, we must recognize as competing rights only the
rights of other members of the society as individuals. We must distinguish the 'rights' of the majority as such, which cannot count as a justification for overruling individual rights, and
the personal rights of members of
38
the majority, which might well count.

It follows, therefore, that if the state represents only society as
a whole, then society does not have rights in the same sense as an
accused individual in a criminal prosecution. It is at this point

that Dworkin makes a critical error by apparently ascribing this
singular role to the state in criminal cases.
A crime must be understood as an offense against society for
which society, in turn, prescribes some penalty or punishment
once the offense is proven. But it is also true that most crimes, 39

certainly those we regard as serious crimes, characteristically involve "individuals (victims of the alleged criminal activity who
are, by virtue of their injuries, distinguishable from the accused
and from society as a whole.) Thus, even if one accepts Dworkin's argument that the rights of society are not rights in the true
sense, one can still speak of the rights of a particular victim of the

alleged crime which can be said to compete with the perceived
rights of the accused. The fact that the rights of the victim are not
advanced by him personally would not appear to be decisive of
the issue one way or another. The point is that, "if individuals
have rights against other people, and if the state has or has not
assumed the obligation to enforce these rights, then it may have
38. Id. at 194.
39. The writer recognizes that there are also victimless crimes in the sense
that no particular individual is harmed by the conduct of the accused, such as a
speeding violation where no one is injured on the highway or a case of defrauding
the government. It would appear that offenses of this sort provide a better fit for
Professor Dworkin's declared exception to the rights thesis than those such as assault, rape, fraud (against a private individual or other legal person) and libel
where the injury or potential danger to a particular individual is readily perceived
and indeed, basic to the instigation of criminal proceedings against the accused.
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rights as a representative of the persons it protects."40
Dworkin states that it is important to "distinguish the 'rights' of
the majority as such, which cannot count as a justification for
overruling individual rights, and the personal rights of members
of a majority, which might well count."41 It is puzzling, therefore,
that having recognized the nature of the distinction implicit in the
identification of a dual role for the state in criminal cases, Dworkin neglects to consider the rights of victims when justifying the
denial of any competing right of the state to a conviction in a
criminal case. Indeed, it may be argued that this failure to distinguish the rights of victims from the instrumentality of the state in
a criminal prosecution is fundamentally inconsistent with Dworkin's own perception of what the rights thesis is required to embody.
A basic norm or right which Dworkin incorporates in his theory
of rights is "that individuals have a right to equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions
that govern them," 42 or, in another context, that "the right to
treatment as an equal, which is the right not to receive the same
distribution of some burden or benefit, but to be treated with the
same respect and concern as anyone else. '43 This basic principle
of equal respect and concern would appear to be squarely at odds
with the notion that a state, in its representative capacity concerning an aggrieved individual, does not have any competing
right to a conviction in a criminal proceeding. Presumably, the
victim of a crime possesses basic rights, as does the accused.
Moreover, neither the burden of proof that the state must satisfy
to prove its case nor exclusionary rules of evidence which may inhibit this process will abrogate the rights of the victim. While the
resources and power of the state may require it to meet a more
rigorous standard of proof than an accused individual who has the
benefit of a basic presumption of innocence in his favor, such
matters should be distinguished from the right of the victim
(through the instrumentality of the state) to a conviction, provided the required standard is met.
In fairness to Professor Dworkin and perhaps in anticipation of
40. Nickel, Dworkin on the Nature and Consequences of Rights, 11 GA. L. REV.
1115, 1137 (1977).
41. TRS, supra note 1, at 194.
42. Id. at 227.
43. Id. at 273.

a counter-argument that he may wish to make with regard to
these apparent inconsistencies in his theory, it is admitted that
his comments upon which the attack centers were phrased primarily in the context of what he would describe as rights againt the
state. However, considerations of equal respect need not be limited to rights of this type. Indeed, according a specific role to the
victim of a criminal act violative of his rights merely places him in
the position of one who has "rights against fellow citizens" as in
an ordinary civil case. 4" This line of argument suggests a partial
collapse of the distinction Dworkin draws between these two species of rights: that "[tjhe former (rights against the state) justify
a political decision that requires some agency of the government
to act; and that the latter (rights against fellow citizens) justify a
decision to coerce particular individuals." 45 However, the
strength of the argument necessarily depends on the validity of
the rights-possessive role ascribed to the victim in opposition to
that of the individual accused of a crime.
This disagreement with Professor Dworkin concerning the exception he allows for the asymmetrical application of the rights
thesis in criminal cases necessarily involves further assumptions
about the nature of criminal law and its purpose in society. The
focus on victims of crimes, which underlies the attack on this limited aspect of the rights thesis, presupposes some affinity for what
are usually described as retributive notions of justice, that is, the
sense that the criminal law imposes a punishment on an individual for his acts against others. No such concern arises if the criminal law is viewed in terms of fulfilling collective goals such as the
rehabilitation of offenders4 6 or simply in terms of the prevention
47
of crime through the deterrence of future criminal acts.
John Locke once observed that "the right to punish" or power
to retribute consisted in a right to impose "what is proportionate
to [the] transgression, which is so much as may serve for Repara44. Id. at 94.
45. Id.
46. Rehabilitation theories in criminal law have been generally refuted in recent writings on criminal sanctions. See E. VAN DER HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS
(1975); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISON-

MENT (1974); Wilson, The Political Feasibility of Punishment, JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 107 (Cederblom and Blizek ed. 1977).
47. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181 (1961). "For Hart, the case for
punishment as a general social practice or institution, rests on the prevention of

crime; it is not to be found either in the inherent appropriateness of punishing
wrongdoing or in the contingently 'corrective' or rehabilitative powers of fines or
imprisonments on some criminals," Wasserstrom, Some Problems with Theories of
Punishment, JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 46, at 188.
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tion and Restraint." 48 Obviously, there are problems with the notion that punishing one person through a criminal sanction serves
to compensate the person who has been harmed by a criminal activity.49 Indeed, while this writer does not mean to give a full account of the complexities of retributive or other theories of
punishment, these concepts must be grappled with insofar as
they may underlie Dworkin's attitude toward criminal cases and
the present questioning of his position on how the rights thesis
should apply to them.
Whatever its limitations, retributivism recognizes the rights of
victims in a fashion akin to that identified by the primary argument, if only because of "the importance it places on the concept
of the person."50 In so doing, it offers a characteristically "moral"
point of view 5 1 which is clearly in step with the rights thesis, provided that the position that victims have rights amenable to representation by the state is valid.
Professor Dworkin does not explicitly relate his view on criminal justice and punishment in the context of the rights thesis. It
is suggested, however, that these views are, to employ the terms
of one writer's classification, "liberal" and "suspect centered". It
is further suggested that he is one of "those whose interest in
criminal justice has been chiefly directed at enlarging the range of
procedural and substantive protections afforded those suspected
of, charged with and penalized for a crime. '52 Should this classifi48. II Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT § 8 (1690), cited in Bedau, Concessions
to Retribution in Punishment, JusTIcE AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 46, at 51.

49. On this view, retribution in punishment consists of two things: making adequate reparation to the victim and making sure the offender commits no further
crimes. No doubt there is an etymological tie among "retribution", "restitution"
and "reparation". But there is no other general connection between putting the
victim back on his feet (restitution or reparation) and inflicting a deprivation on
the offender (punishment), and so there is no way in general to explain the latter
even in part by reference to the former.
50. Wasserstom, supra note 47, at 187.
51. Professor Hart has delineated the following model of a retributive theory
illustrative of the point. "Such a theory will assert three things: first, that a person may be punished if, and only if, he has voluntarily done something morally
wrong; secondly, that his punishment must in some way match, or be the
equivalent of, the wickedness of his offense; and thirdly, that the justification for
punishing men under such conditions is that the return of suffering for moral evil
voluntarily done, is itself just or morally good." H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONsiBurry 231 (1968). This is not to suggest, however, that Professor Hart
himself subscribes to such a model. See note 46, supra.
52. Wilson, supra note 46, at 107. The same writer labels the "victim centered"
approach as "conservative" in the name of those "who have chiefly sought to en-

cation substantially reflect Dworkin's viewpoint, it might serve to
explain his apparent desire to eliminate the entitlement of the
state to a conviction in a criminal case, notwithstanding the rights
the victim of a criminal act may possess.
Regardless of whether or not a retributivist account of criminal
cases serves to justify an asymmetrical application of the rights
theses as in civil cases, it is important to recognize that very little
actually separates the two. "What distinguishes a criminal from a
civil sanction and all that distinguishes it," writes Professor
Henry M. Hart, "is the judgment of community condemnation
which accompanies . . .its imposition."5 3 This distinction, while
certainly significant, at the same time fails to preclude the notion
of competing rights as between victim and accused. In this regard
it is further suggested that the sanction imposed, which in a criminal case consists of an at least temporary incarceration of the accused, 54 is to be further distinguished from the determination of
criminal liability wherein the evaluation of the competing rights
between victim and accused would take place. Thus, a competing
right of the state (in its representative capacity) to a conviction
does not necessarily extend to the state an entitlement to a sentence. 55 Indeed, the situation is analogous to a civil proceeding
where the determination of liability and the assessment of damages are similarly separate questions. In his argument of individual rights against the state, Professor Dworkin admits that,
"[c Iitizens have personal rights to the state's protection as well as
personal rights to be free from the state's interference, and it may
be necessary for the government to choose between these two
sorts of rights."56 In this instance Dworkin was citing the law of
hance the powers of order maintenance and penalty imposing institutions in order
to protect society." Id. at 108. What the latter classification ignores, however, is
that a victim centered approach-at least in a retributivist mold-accords primacy
to the individuals involved and not to the goals of society.
53. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 401 (1958), cited in J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 99 (1970).
54. Professor Dworkin is assumed to be of the view that an individual has a
fundamental right not to be incarcerated by the State. "We might come to accept
... the principle that men should sometimes be made to be free." TRS, supra
note I at 156. Such a right the individual may lose only in consequence of valid
statute declarative of a community policy upon which the right may be denied in
response to a prevailing social goal: e.g., public safety; however, a judge may deal
with the issue as one of principle, appreciating the distinction Dworkin makes between "concrete" rights and "competing claims of abstract rights", recognizing
that "the weight of a competing principle may be less than the weight of the appropriate parallel policy." TRS, supra note 1, at 93, 100.
55. An entitlement to a conviction of the accused for murder does not necessarily mean that a state may also prescribe the death penalty. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); but see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), upholding the same Georgia statute amended after the decision of the Court in Furman.
56. TRS, supra note 1, at 193.
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defamation to illustrate the notion of competing rights. However,
if the foregoing arguments have any validity at all, then Dworkin
has failed to explain why .a similar notion should not govern
equally in the judicial consideration of a criminal case.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion has been an attempt to demonstrate
how Professor Dworkin's asymmetrical application of the rights
thesis to criminal cases is not generally supported by the examples he employs; the case law cited in reliance for his position,
notwithstanding the reservations Dworkin places upon it, in fact
destroys rather than preserves the distinction between civil and
criminal cases which he advocates; accordingly, the created exception to the overall application of the concept undermines the
rights thesis as a whole. It remains unclear whether Dworkin
views the exception he perceives as one he feels compelled to
make so that his theory may retain descriptive accuracy, or
whether he considers it to be a desirable anomaly in the light of
his primary concern for the rights of individuals against the powers of the state. It is reasonable to assume, however, as suggested
by some of the discussion concerning statements made by Dworkin elsewhere in his book, that the concession was enthusiastic
rather than grudging.
It may be that Professor Dworkin will choose to reconsider the
criminal cases exception to the rights thesis. In that result, it is
hoped any such reconsideration will display a greater sensitivity
to that category of individuals with which this article has been
concerned.

